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Control by Aggregation?  
Critical Reflections on Global Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Looming 
Transnational Emergency Powers 
 
Ming-Sung Kuo 
<Abstract> 
This paper rethinks the relationship between rights protection and global 
constitutionalism by taking on the issue of the latter’s corresponding political order in the light 
of looming transnational emergency powers. By removing the veil from the aggregate power 
structure underlying global constitutionalism, it makes a twofold argument about global 
constitutionalism. First, in contrast to the separation of powers in domestic constitutional 
orders—which operates as a structure of “articulated governance” based on the logic of 
articulation—the structure of aggregate power prevents transnational governance from 
growing into another all-powerful sovereign creature—what will be called “control by 
aggregation.” Yet such control is limited. With respect to a transnational state of emergency 
such as that illustrated by the Eurozone crisis, this paper further argues that the structure of 
control by aggregation founders when constituent sovereign states continue to be the masters 
of international relations. To tame transnational executive power, a rethinking of global 
constitutionalism along the lines of articulation is suggested. Non-sovereign constituent 
regimes under multilevel constitutional ordering can act as an irritant to force sovereign states 
to articulate emergency actions, paving the way to opening shadowy transnational 
administration to public scrutiny. 
Keywords: global constitutionalism, federation, articulated governance, multilevel 
constitutional ordering, global governance, aggregate power, transnational state 
of emergency, constitutional project 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Having emerged as a rallying cry for contemporary idealists following its successes in 
displacing racism, communism, and other totalitarian ideologies within the political space of 
the nation-state (Somek, 2014, p. 10), constitutionalism1 is now in trouble around the globe. 
“Populist demagogy” (Manent, 2017), “constitutional capture” (Scheppele, 2017), and other 
tricks have resulted in widespread “democratic backsliding” among constitutional democracies 
both old and new, North and South (Bermeo, 2016). With the focus shifting toward how to 
stop populist authoritarianism from engulfing domestic constitutional orders, talk of “global 
constitutionalism”2 sounds more like untimely shoe-gazing than like a development plan for 
new frontiers of constitutionalism. Worse still, transnational governance—the new frontier 
where global constitutionalism is expected to thrive—turns out to be no less wild than the 
nation-state. And, as will be further discussed, in those new constitutional frontiers lying 
beyond the national political space, emergency powers are also exercised at the expense of 
human rights (cf. Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2015; Kahn, 2000, pp. 34-6). Failing to 
compensate, as had been hoped, for the weakening of national constitutions that has resulted 
from regional integration and from other moves toward transnational governance (cf. Peters 
2006), global constitutionalism demonstrates the faults in its control of political power and 
protection of fundamental rights. Constitutionalism, national and global, appears to be entering 
a long winter. 
As the global constitutional landscape turns gloomy, then, it is high time to reckon with 
the vision of taking constitutionalism beyond the nation-state. In light of a transnational state 
of emergency, in this paper I rethink the relationship between rights protection and global 
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constitutionalism by taking on the issue of the latter’s corresponding political order.3 I shall 
argue that the idea of aggregate power holds the key to understanding the political logic of 
global constitutionalism. Yet, to be more than an aspirational discourse, global 
constitutionalism must move beyond the thinking of aggregation that undergirds proposals for 
recasting transnational political ordering as a “multilevel constitutional compound” 4  and 
instead provide an answer to the question of power structure. 
By lifting the veil on the underlying structure of aggregate power, I make a twofold 
argument about global constitutionalism. First, in contrast to the separation of powers in 
domestic constitutional orders—which operates as a structure of “articulated governance” 
based on the logic of articulation (Waldron, 2016, pp. 62-5)—the structure of aggregate power 
holds back transnational governance from growing into another all-powerful sovereign 
creature. This is what I call “control by aggregation.” Yet such control is limited. With respect 
to the transnational state of emergency as illustrated in the Eurozone crisis, I further argue that 
the structure of control by aggregation founders when constituent sovereign states continue to 
be the masters of international relations and thereby allow themselves to create new 
governance regimes outside the existing constitutional compound. To tame transnational 
executive power, I suggest realigning global constitutionalism with thinking on articulation. 
Though reconfiguring a multilevel constitutional order as one of articulated governance is still 
a distant dream, non-sovereign “constituent regimes”5 might act as an “irritant” so as to force 
their sovereign masters to articulate their emergency actions, paving the way to opening 
shadowy transnational administration to public scrutiny.  
As part of my conceptual exploration of the as-yet-rudimentary political ordering of 
 4 
global constitutionalism, I have chosen multilevel constitutionalism as the case in point, for it 
has been developed and debated with corresponding political ordering in mind (vis-à-vis the 
nation-state) among varieties of global constitutionalism. 
The argument set out in this paper will unfold as follows. It will first bring to the fore the 
question of political power in global constitutionalism (Section 2), and then explain why 
thinking on aggregation undergirds power structures in multilevel political ordering (the 
predominant political model of global constitutionalism), by comparing it to the constitutional 
structure of articulated governance in the domestic context (Section 3). With the aggregate 
structure of multilevel political ordering thus brought to light, its limitations will be revealed 
through a discussion of EU-steered emergency responses to the Eurozone crisis (Section 4). 
As a response to a transnational state of emergency, answers to the challenges facing multilevel 
political ordering in general will then be further considered (Section 5). 
2. DISCOVERING THE POWER: THE POLITICAL QUESTION IN 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM REVISITED  
One of the most salient facts about global constitutionalism is that not all constitutional 
scholars embrace the world it envisages (but cf. Hirschl, 2018). Who would reject the better 
rights protection and the reining-in of global governance power that are supposed features of 
global constitutionalism? Yet such discord is no mystery if we take a closer look at the reasons 
held by those skeptics. It is true that some of them take the view that global constitutionalism 
is merely a repackaging of the idea of “world government” and should be resisted. A world 
government even in the guise of global constitutionalism suggests the end of self-government, 
casting a shadow over human rights (Posner, 2009; see Kuyper, 2015; Rabkin, 2005, pp. 18-
19). And beside these hard skeptics stands a loyal opposition, so to speak. Though these loyal 
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dissenters have no doubt about the centrality of human rights to global constitutionalism, they 
remain unpersuaded that it is a cause worth pursuing. Some are troubled by the loosely-defined 
idea of global constitutionalism, fearing that it will do more harm than good to the 
constitutional project because of its very elusiveness and malleability (e.g., Grimm, 2016, pp. 
337-44); others question attempts to transpose the national constitutional order to the global 
level because of the fundamental differences between the transnational space of global 
governance and nation-states (Krisch, 2010, pp. 52-66; Loughlin, 2010a, pp. 66-7). Notably, it 
is the question of political ordering that separates hard skeptics from loyal dissenters: can we 
conceive of a political order within the conceptual framework of global constitutionalism 
without signing up to the idea of world government underpinned by a worldwide large-C 
Constitution? For hard skeptics, the answer is no; for loyal dissenters, global constitutionalism 
is still a utopian dream so long as that political question continues to be dodged. As history 
shows that constitutionalism is a political project in response to a new modality of political 
power (Grimm, 2016, pp. 6-12, 45-52), the question of how political power is structured within 
the framework of global constitutionalism with no worldwide Constitution in sight must be 
answered if global constitutionalism is to be taken forward (Cohen, 2012, pp. 1-5; Krisch, 
2016, pp. 668-71; Kennedy, 2009, pp. 65-8). 
To address this issue, constitutional scholars and political theorists turn to the prototype 
of global constitutional ordering—the EU project—for inspiration (Cohen, 2012, p. 10; Müller, 
2010, p. 240; see also Krisch, 2016, pp. 663-5). As has already been well discussed in the 
literature, the EU project is best captured by the concept of “multilevel constitutionalism” 
(Verfassungsverbund) (Mayer and Wendel, 2012, pp. 129-30; Pernice, 1999, 2009, 2015; 
Voßkuhle, 2010, p. 183; but see Barents, 2012; Lindseth, 2010, p. 265). Looked at through this 
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lens, the EU project, pivoting on the normative values enshrined in the EU’s foundational 
treaties, functions as a multilevel constitutionalized political order that comprises layers of 
constitutional regimes, including the EU in the strict sense, its member states, and other 
institutional affiliates both formal and informal (Mayer and Wendel, 2012, pp. 129-30; Pernice, 
1999, 2009, 2015; Voßkuhle, 2010, p. 183; see also Isiksel, 2016; Tuori, 2015; but cf. Lindseth, 
2016). By analogy with the experience of European integration, Jean Cohen, among others, 
tackles the political question of global constitutionalism head-on. In view of the interlocking 
of nation-states, regional bodies, international organizations, and other global governance 
authorities, including the United Nations (UN), she contends that it is not only a natural result 
of the overlapping of regulatory needs and function but also suggests a rudimentary global 
political ordering that needs to be recast in constitutional terms (Cohen, 2012, pp. 21-6). 
Focusing on the UN Charter system in global governance, she further asserts that, as each 
constituent regime thereunder operates on a set of rules and standards, the UN and its member 
states, as well as other governance regimes, jointly constitute a global federal union, or a 
compound of multiple constitutional regimes (ibid., pp. 84-5). By analogy to the EU project as 
a multilevel political order that works under the guidance of constitutional pluralism, the 
relationships between the distinct constituents of the global multilevel constitutional 
compound can be considered coordinate rather than hierarchical (ibid., pp. 66-76.). Moreover, 
it can even be argued that such coordinate interrelationships are steered according to principles 
such as proportionality, subsidiarity, procedural propriety, and human rights (see Kumm, 2009, 
pp. 290-303). In other words, not only each constituent regime but also their inter-regime 
relationships are constitutionally structured (cf. Walker, 2012; but see Cohen, 2012, pp. 321, 
402 n.1). 
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Notably, such a multilevel constitutional compound is not the creation of a single 
constituent power, as no global demos exists (see Krisch, 2016, pp. 675-8).6 Rather, the very 
functional intertwinement in global governance can be seen as framing the interactions among 
its constituent regimes in a similar way to how a treaty (or a contract) shapes the relationship 
between contracting parties.7 In this light, a global constitutional compound makes it appear 
as if a global composite polity is operating on a treaty-like arrangement among constitutional 
constituents. Drawing inspiration from theories of federation, Cohen, for example, explicitly 
recasts the political ordering of global governance, as illustrated in the complex UN Charter 
system, in constitutional terms (Cohen, 2012, pp. 80-158). “Federation” is the political form 
of global constitutionalism (ibid., pp. 157-8). 
Taken as a whole, the idea of global constitutionalism is operationalized in the following 
terms. The global composite polity—modeled on the federation, pivoting on the UN Charter 
system, and conceived as a multilevel political order—comprises layers of coordinate 
constituents such as nation-states, regional regimes, international organizations, and other 
global governance bodies (ibid., pp. 48-9, 157-8); by this view, the constitution of the 
globalized political landscape is not the UN Charter as some commentators have suggested 
(see Fassbender, 1998; Fassbender, 2009; cf. Habermas, 2006, pp. 102, 104-5, 158-61). Rather, 
the working global constitution amounts to a multilevel constitutional compound consisting of 
all the constitutions of its coordinate constituents, overlaid by the UN Charter as an overarching 
component constitution (Cohen, 2012, pp. 288-91). Out of this we see emerge a multilevel 
constitutional ordering as the epitome of global constitutionalism, envisaging a world of 
controlled political power aimed at the enhancement of human rights (Dunoff and Trachtman, 
2009b, pp. 11-13). 
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There is no denying that the global political order as sketched above is futurist in 
character, in that it is far from complete yet is incubating amid the existing dynamics of 
transnational governance. Yet, as a conceptual framework, this avant-garde constitutional 
reimagining has the potential to shape the direction of the world political order and should not 
be dismissed out of hand (Walker, 2012, pp. 32-6). The question then arises: does an envisaged 
multilevel constitutional compound provide a satisfactory answer to the question of political 
ordering in global constitutionalism? The answer lies in its underlying structure and logic of 
political power.  
3. UNVEILING THE AGGREGATE STRUCTURE: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN A MULTILEVEL POLITICAL 
ORDERING 
As suggested above, constitutionalism is a political project in response to a changing 
political landscape at the dawn of the modern age. To see more clearly the structure and logic 
of political power in the envisaged multilevel constitutional ordering, we need to retrace the 
path of modern constitutionalism by starting with the concept of the constitution. As an idea 
(or ideology) centering on the normative framing of political power with “the constitution” 
(Somek, 2014, p. 1), 8  constitutionalism is of course tied to the modern concept of the 
constitution (Böckenförde, 2017, pp. 152-7; Grimm, 2016, pp. 3-6, 43-4). What distinguishes 
the modern constitution from its premodern predecessors is that it (re)shapes rather than 
mirrors the exercise of political power. Providing for governmental organization and the 
conditions for its exercise of power, the modern constitution not only limits but also creates 
and legitimates political power (Böckenförde, 2017, pp. 161-2; Grimm, 2016, p. 145; Preuss, 
1995, pp. 5-6; see also Loughlin, 2010b, p. 106). Looming from this modern constitution is an 
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image of autonomous political power that is able to steer and reshape society without being 
harnessed by non-governmental forces (Böckenförde, 1991, p. 27; Grimm, 2016, pp. 4-15; 
Krisch, 2016, pp. 659-62; Loughlin, 2010b, pp. 102-7). I hasten to add that this does not 
suggest that the modern constitution conceives a government with unlimited power; instead, 
the dominant role of the government in steering social relations itself gave rise to the modern 
constitutional movement in the seventeenth century (Böckenförde, 2017, pp. 155-7; Grimm, 
2016, pp. 7-10, 50-52; see also Loughlin, 2010b, pp. 164-79, 228-31; Preuss, 1995, pp. 109-
13). When the modern state gradually distinguished itself from other sites of authority as the 
autonomous center of political power following the winding process of centralization set out 
in the thirteenth century, it found itself at first equipped with premodern constitutional 
arrangements (Böckenförde, 1991, pp. 26-7; Grimm, 2016, pp. 45-9; see also Glenn, 2013, pp. 
17-85). Under this premodern constitutional order, the political power of early modern states 
was indeed autonomous, but also absolutist as connoted in the concept of sovereignty as the 
premodern “constitution” simply mirrored power (Grimm, 2016, pp. 43-4; Somek, 2014, p. 
37). Since the emergence of civil society in the predawn of the modern constitutional 
movement, how to strike a balance between a steering government and a free society has been 
central to the constitutional design of political power (Böckenförde, 2017, pp. 155-7; Loughlin, 
2010b, pp. 164-79; see also Kuo, 2010). 
Departing as they do from unlimited political power, modern constitutions carve out a 
free space for civil society which can be tapped for political replenishment and constitutional 
refounding (see Preuss, 1995, pp. 2-4, 52-53). Through political representation, citizens are 
included in the collective authorship of the laws that steer their lives (Kahn and Brennan-
Marquez, 2014). As the medium through which citizens turn political ideas and visions into 
 10 
workable policies and legal commands, separation of powers came to characterize the modern 
constitutional government of the sovereign state (see generally Möllers, 2013). Modern 
constitutionalism manages the tension between absolutism and autonomy in political 
sovereignty through a structure of what might be called institutional reflexivity (Preuss, 1996, 
pp. 16-7). Notably, as Jeremy Waldron (2016) observes, what lies at the heart of the separation 
of powers is a “stepwise” decision-making process: by way of intense debate, repeated 
reflection, and close scrutiny within and between the administration, legislature, and courts, 
ideas and visions can be turned into political reality (pp. 62-70). Seen in this light, the 
relationship between government and civil society is not one of conflict; rather, as government 
and civil society articulate with one another, it is reflexive as the government and the civil 
society are articulated to each other (see generally Rosanvallon, 2008; Grimm 2016, pp. 50-
52; Loughlin, 2010b, pp. 228-31). Moreover, the organization of government power is not so 
much one of separation as one of articulation. Not only are distinct government departments 
mutually articulated, but the multiple stages of reflexive decision-making across the three 
constitutional powers jointly constitute a structure of articulated governance aimed at the 
realization of “self-determination” in constitutional form (Waldron, 2016, pp. 62-5; see also 
Möllers, 2013, pp. 51-109). As it turns out, then, “controlling the state”—the main theme of 
constitutionalism (Gordon, 1999)—is more about the constitution of articulated governance 
than about that of limited government. 
In contrast to the path toward modern constitutionalism, the multilevel ordering 
envisaged in global constitutionalism does not emerge in the face of yet another centralization 
of political power. Rather, it is an attempt to place the already existing overlapping units of 
political power beneath an overarching constitutional framework (Cohen, 2012, pp. 66-76). 
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What is the state of political power that requires such a recasting in constitutional terms? 
Noticeably, sovereign states are not the only exercisers of political power in international 
relations. International organizations have long existed alongside their sovereign masters 
(Weiler, 2004, pp. 553-61). Though international organizations still owe their existence to the 
will of sovereign states, power continues to be transferred from the latter to the former in the 
face of more and more issues of a transboundary nature (Somek, 2012, pp. 47-8). Remaining 
masters de jure, however, sovereign states rely on international organizations to achieve their 
governance goals (Cassese, 2005, pp. 671-3). Seen in this light, the matter of governance is 
trans-national in nature. Moreover, variously labeled as “regimes”, “arrangements”, 
“networks” or other obscure names, unconventional forms of governance have mushroomed 
alongside sovereign states and international organizations to address new challenges 
(Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 2005, pp. 18-27). Through this prism, the political landscape 
of global governance is fragmented, and filled with diverse power-exercisers with overlapping 
competences (ibid.); a “non-mediated relationship” is emerging between individuals and the 
variegated regimes of global governance (Somek, 2012, p. 47). With the role of the sovereign 
state in steering society thus weakened, global governance today appears to be a substitute for 
autonomous political power. 
It is of course true that these diverse, overlapping governance regimes can be treated as 
they are without placing them under an overarching constitutional framework or within any 
single institutional arrangement; with erudite legal analysis, they can find their own place in 
international law (cf. de Witte, 2011, pp. 42-9). Yet two issues stand out, to which international 
law offers no satisfactory answers. First, as interactions between diverse and overlapping 
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governance regimes becomes more frequent and complex, international law only manages 
through extraordinary lawyerly gymnastics to address those inter-regime relationships (Somek, 
2012, pp. 47-8). As a result, potential conflicts between the distinct power-exercisers of 
overlapping competences have become a major concern of global governance (Koskenniemi, 
2007; Young, 2012, p. 2; see also Roughan, 2013, pp. 61-81). Second, the function of national 
constitutions in reshaping political power by controlling the state and protecting rights has 
become increasingly stretched, with political power continuously transferred to other 
governance regimes (see Dunoff and Trachtman, 2009b, pp. 5-9; Grimm, 2016, pp. 321-7; see 
also Böckenförde, 2017, p. 340). And here is where the project of multilevel constitutionalism 
comes into play. 
Given the centrality of the question of political ordering to her rethinking of the 
fragmented landscape of transnational governance, 9  let us look closer at Cohen’s neo-
federalist global constitutional project. As global governance continues to weaken the role of 
sovereign states as autonomous centers of political power, Cohen aims to answer the 
constitutional question on the global scale with the UN Charter reconceived now as the overlay 
to a Charter-centered, composite, global constitutional framework. Within such a global 
constitutional compound, all power-exercisers—be they sovereign states, supranational 
regimes, international organizations, or other governance units—interact with one another 
(Cohen, 2012, pp. 6-7; see also Habermas, 2006, pp. 158-61; cf. Mayer and Wendel, 2012, pp. 
129-30). In this way, issues of inter-regime relationships and transfer of political power are 
resolved as if re-examined through constitutional lenses (see also Dunoff and Trachtman, 
2009b, pp. 6-9; Paulus, 2009, pp. 69-70). In Cohen’s view (2012), the UN Charter, as the 
constitutional overlay to a UN-centred global constitutional compound, is not to be considered 
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a “higher” law vis-à-vis national constitutions or the functional equivalents of non-state power-
exercisers. Instead, as one of the myriad components of the global composite constitutional 
framework, the UN Charter plays a dual role: it is the constitutional document of the UN 
proper, while also functioning as the constitutional instrument defining the relationship 
between the UN and other related power-exercisers in that system of global governance (pp. 
69-76, 288-91). 
Cohen’s general constitutional characterization of the UN Charter is not without 
question, however. Apart from the contradictory constitutional character of its provisions 
(Kuo, 2014a, pp. 287-8), it is incredible that the UN Charter actually defines the relationship 
between the UN and other related power-exercisers in the same way as would a (global) 
constitutional contract in a (global) federation (Krisch, 2016, pp. 669-70). Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that federation fails to account for the political ordering of global 
constitutionalism. Rather, contrary to her contention, the constitutional linchpin of Cohen’s 
envisaged global federation must be located somewhere else than within the UN Charter. To 
fully account for a UN-centered global constitutional ordering, the UN Charter must be joined 
by all the constitutional arrangements governing the numerous constituent regimes of global 
governance, not to mention national constitutions (cf. Mayer and Wendel, 2012, pp. 129-31). 
More importantly, interrelationships between component constitutional units are defined 
neither by the UN Charter nor by other treaties but are instead worked out in a spirit of 
“constitutional tolerance” (see also Weiler, 2011, pp. 8-9, 12-13; but cf. Cohen, 2012, pp. 65, 
73-4). In other words, the overarching constitutional “contract” of the global federation is more 
convention-based than treaty-defined (Somek, 2014, pp. 50-2), while the overarching 
composite constitution of global governance results from the constitutional add-ons of its 
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constituent regimes. Hence a multilevel constitutional compound. 
Juxtaposed with the modern constitution in response to the rise of the sovereign state as 
the predominant political actor, the structure and logic of multilevel constitutionalism becomes 
clear. As discussed above, modern constitutionalism conceives of a government of articulated 
powers by tying the sovereign state to a constitutional form (Böckenförde, 2017, pp. 152-4; 
Loughlin and Walker, 2007, pp. 1-4; Somek, 2014, pp. 36-9, 47-51; see also Loughlin, 2010a, 
pp. 209-57). While global constitutionalism echoes the normative calls of its modern 
predecessor, the multilevel constitutional compound at the core of global constitutionalism 
more reflects than reshapes the state of the political power in the present world. Specifically, 
guided by the ethos of constitutional tolerance instead of normative constitutional provisions, 
it is interactions between the constituent regimes of the multilevel constitutional compound 
that in practice work out potential inter-regime conflicts. Of particular pertinence to the present 
discussion, global governance is far from being an entity of unlimited power, despite its lack 
of separation of powers (that defining feature of the modern constitution). Indeed, transnational 
governance regimes have been criticized for being weak in responding to global issues (see 
generally Hale, Held and Young, 2013; see also Heath, 2016, pp. 27-8), though, as will be 
further discussed, their responsive measures can be forceful. Viewed in this way, the multilevel 
constitutional compound appears to deliver on the normative promise of modern 
constitutionalism—the control of political power—by pivoting its envisaged political ordering 
upon the complex practice of global governance.  
Yet the limited power of global governance does not result from this multilevel 
constitutional compound. Rather, it is inherent in the power structure and logic of global 
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governance. As it stands, global governance is anything but the holder of autonomous political 
power but instead simply the aggregation of the fragmented, diverse units of individual 
governance. Power in global governance is thus aggregate in nature. More importantly, under 
this aggregate power structure, constituent units remain distinct and in potential competition, 
if not collision, with each other. The flipside to the aggregate structure of global governance is 
the balancing provided by myriad power-exercisers. As constituent units compete with and 
check each other, a balance of power seems to take shape in global governance, evoking the 
checks and balances function of separation of powers (Waldron, 2016, p. 49). Thanks to this 
balance, an all-powerful transnational sovereignty fails to arise within the multilevel 
constitutional compound (Somek, 2014, pp. 176-8, 225-32). To put it differently, as was seen 
in the antebellum United States as well as in the Second German Reich, a global federation as 
Cohen envisages functions insomuch as the question of sovereignty is left unanswered in the 
corresponding constitutional arrangement (see Cohen, 2012, pp. 116-50; see also Böckenförde, 
2017, pp. 159-61; Schmitt, 2008, pp. 383-407). In sum, it is the structure and logic of aggregate 
power—not the constitution of articulated governance and separated powers—that rein in the 
federation of global governance. Just how effective this aggregate structure of power can be in 
keeping sovereign-like forces out of the new global constitutional space was put to the test in 
the Eurozone crisis, to which I now turn.  
4. LOSING CONTROL: THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The measures fashioned by the EU, the exemplary multilevel constitutional order in 
global constitutionalism, to respond to the Eurozone crisis have been criticised for reasons 
relating to the rule of law principle. First, they are blamed for subverting human rights and 
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undermining the European social model (Baraggia, 2015, p. 277; White, 2015a, p. 306). Apart 
from the mandatory individual “bail-ins” introduced as part of the Cypriot rescue package, the 
lowering of living standards resulting from national austerity measures was ascribed to the 
conditionality requirements tied to the bailouts for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus as well 
as Spain (see Baraggia, 2015, pp. 278-9; Kuo, 2014b, p. 85). Second, the dominant role of 
member states’ national administrations, aided by the technocrats of the Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB), have invited criticism of “authoritarian managerialism” 
(Joerges and Weimer, 2013, p. 296; see also Curtin, 2014, pp. 4-23). Not only did the 
legislative role of national parliaments in vetting the bailout conditionality instruments become 
nominal, but democratic will, as manifested in the referendum before the Greek government’s 
reluctant acceptance of the second bailout in July 2015, was also pushed aside under pressure 
from creditors (Baraggia, 2015, pp. 281-3; Kuo, 2014b, p. 85; Scicluna, 2017, pp. 104-6). 
Third, the multifarious legal instruments governing responses to the Eurozone crisis have fallen 
far short of the standards of transparency, predictability, and certainty as required by the rule 
of law (Kilpatrick, 2015). Among the issues concerning the formal rule of law requirements, 
the ambiguous legal status of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was 
instrumental in individual bailouts, has made judicial oversight even more difficult (ibid., pp. 
337-40). Moreover, uncertainties as to the sources of bailout legal instruments have added to 
the complexity (ibid., pp. 344-5). Related to this complexity issue has been the tendency of the 
EU and member states to act around, beyond, or even outside the existing EU constitutional 
framework amid the Eurozone crisis (ibid. pp. 333-7; White, 2015b, p. 588). It is debatable 
whether the tendency toward extraconstitutional choices has resulted in a genuine state of 
emergency or exception at the transnational level (compare Joerges, 2016, pp. 317-22; Kuo, 
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2014b; Scicluna, 2014, p. 563; White, 2015a, pp. 308-15; but see Kilpatrick, 2015, p. 328). 
Nevertheless, its extraordinary character speaks to the EU as a constitutional order of aggregate 
power and thus warrants close examination. 
According to Claire Kilpatrick, the EU’s choice of foundational bailout instruments 
evolved in four stages, following on from the EU-law-based bailouts to several member states 
outside the Eurozone at the early stage of the sovereign debt crisis (Kilpatrick, 2015, pp. 333-
6). The first stage was the loan agreement involving Greece, other Eurozone states, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that underpinned the first Greek bailout in May 2010 
(Ruffert, 2011, p. 1779; see also Kilpatrick, 2015, p. 334). Concerned about the evident 
incompatibility of the first Greek bailout with the “no bail clause” of Article 125 (1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Ruffert, 2011, pp. 1785-87), the 
EU and member states wasted no time in moving to the later stages in their evolving design of 
the foundational bailout instrument. Council Regulation 407/2010 of May 10, 2010, which 
established the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) under the “emergency 
clause” of Article 122 (2) of the TFEU, marked the second stage (Kilpatrick, 2015, p. 334). 
The third stage was contemporaneous with the second: given the EFSM’s limited capacity, the 
temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created as a parallel entity based 
on assorted legal instruments, which distinguished the third stage from the EU-law-based 
second stage. The EFSF, formally a limited liability company incorporated under Luxembourg 
private law, actually originated in an international agreement among the representatives of the 
Eurozone states meeting within the existing framework of the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN) on May 11, 2010 (ibid.). The EFSM was applied only to the Irish and 
Portuguese bailouts, whereas the EFSF played a role both in those two instances and in the 
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evolving Greek rescue packages (ibid., pp. 334-5). Notably, despite its ostensible legal basis 
in Article 122 (2), the EFSM’s role in the Irish and Portuguese bailouts of the second stage 
was received differentially with respect to their conformity to the emergency clause (Ruffert, 
2011, p. 1787). Moreover, the third stage’s EFSF was seen as a legal maneuver to circumvent 
the ban on bailouts in Article 125 (1) (ibid., p. 1785). In sum, then, doubt continued to be cast 
on the compatibility with the EU constitutional order of the foundational bailout instruments 
adopted in the second and third stages.  
To dispel legal uncertainty surrounding the temporary EFSF and the limited EFSM and 
to enhance the capacity to address an unrelenting crisis, the choices as to foundational bailout 
instruments proceeded to a fourth stage, wherein the focus was on the establishment of a 
permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), formally established under a treaty among 
the Eurozone states. Notably, when the foundational ESM Treaty was adopted on February 2, 
2012,10 the amendment of the TFEU, which was meant to clear up remaining doubts over the 
legal basis for a permanent mechanism, was yet to be completed under a simplified revision 
procedure as provided for in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). 11  Since its 
establishment in 2012, the ESM has funded bailouts to Cyprus and Greece and the limited 
financial sector Spanish loan assistance (Kilpatrick, 2015, pp. 335-6). Leaving aside the 
problematic invocation of the simplified revision procedure to introduce such a profound 
institutional change, the very creation of the ESM as an international organization under public 
international law outside the EU has culminated in the growing complexity of the EU 
constitutional compound (Ruffert, 2011, pp. 1788-9).  
Mirroring extraconstitutional choices as to foundational bailout instruments, the parallel 
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economic governance reforms have likewise demonstrated the self-same tendency of the EU 
and its member states to circumvent the existing EU constitutional framework. Take for 
example the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (TSCG, also known as the Fiscal Stability Treaty)—the very pillar of Euro-crisis-
induced governance reform. Initially planned as a revision of the EU’s foundational treaties, 
the TSCG was eventually signed as a separate treaty outside the EU constitutional framework 
because of the UK’s opposition,12 despite its dubious deviation from the CJEU jurisprudence 
(see de Witte, 2011, p. 35). Taken together, the assorted approaches adopted by the EU and its 
member states to the choice of foundational bailout instruments and institutional reform amid 
the Eurozone crisis has indicated a deliberate circumvention of EU constitutional requirements, 
only adding the EU’s constitutional complexity. 
I hasten to note that such EU-steered extraconstitutional responses have not resulted in 
separation from the EU constitutional compound. Rather, those constitution-circumventing 
mechanisms have continued to be associated with the EU in varying degrees (Kilpatrick, 2015, 
pp. 336-7). As suggested above, in addition to the EU-law-based EFSM, the decision to 
establish the corporate EFSF was taken in the same ECONFIN wherein the regulation 
establishing the EFSM was passed, whereas the ESM’s foundational treaty was adopted 
following the initiation of a choreographed amendment to the TFEU. Moreover, EU 
institutions have been borrowed to facilitate the ESM. The Commissioner for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB are recruited as observers to the ESM’s board 
of governors, which comprises the ministers of finance of all the Eurozone states (Ruffert, 
2011, p. 1783). Also, the Court of Justice (CJEU) is borrowed to adjudicate on internal disputes 
of the ESM, albeit only under the restrictive procedure in Article 273 of the TFEU (ibid.). The 
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TSCG is even set to be integrated into the EU.13 Apart from such formal affiliations, some 
informal institutional arrangements have emerged and have stayed outside the EU legal 
framework, but with institutional elements of the EU involved. The so-called “troika”, which 
comprises the IMF, the ECB, and the Commission, is the foremost example (Kilpatrick, 2015, 
p. 336).14  
Apart from the substance of the extraordinary measures taken by the EU and its member 
states, the extraconstitutional form of its actions in response to the Euro crisis merits further 
investigation in its own right. In reaction to the extraconstitutional choices made by the EU 
and its member states, adherents of the European project and its multilevel constitutional 
ordering have deplored the deviation from the path of “integration through law” (Joerges, 
2016). Some blame executive dominance and advocate enhanced parliamentary oversight 
(Curtin, 2014, pp. 29-32); others point the finger at technocratic proclivity and pin hopes on a 
more democratic Europe (Scicluna, 2014); still others regard this extraconstitutional tendency 
to more intergovernmentalism as a nationalist turn on the constitutional path to integration 
(Weiler, 2012; but cf. Joerges, 2016). Despite the tactical differences between these analyses 
and prescriptions, all agree on the strategy needed to bring such extraconstitutional choices 
into the fold—the EU’s current constitutional malaise can be overcome by fixing the design 
flaws inherent in its compound constitution (cf. Joerges, 2016, pp. 313-31; Scicluna, 2014, p. 
557). Yet, before setting out a way forward, an accurate diagnosis of the problem is needed. 
Structural constitutional issues have not escaped the eyes of students of the EU project. The 
structural asymmetry between a centralized monetary policy and the autonomy of member 
states in economic policy and other affairs is considered responsible for the current 
extraconstitutional condition (Joerges, 2016, pp. 299-301, 313-16). Nevertheless, this view 
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does not quite tell us why a crisis-induced state of economic emergency has taken the form of 
constitutional complexity. 
Actually, the fundamental reason behind the decisions to create a plethora of new 
institutional arrangements outside and around—but not separate from—the EU proper is not 
hard to understand. As the EU (or, to be more precise, its predecessor) was not designed to 
become the “supranational polity” that it is (Stone Sweet and Caporaso, 1998; see also 
Lindseth, 2010), its multifaceted functions have grown like add-ons on the assumption of 
conferred powers (Davies, 2015, pp. 7-12). Driven by functional optimization, the EU has 
gradually received powers transferred from member states and has grown into a quasi-polity 
well beyond a transnational administration of strategic resources or free-trade area (see 
Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013). Nevertheless, when the sovereign debt crisis struck, the EU 
found difficulty tackling it from within those conferred legal competences. To save the Euro, 
the symbol and linchpin of the EU project, the EU and member states decided to act outside 
the EU constitutional compound, suggesting that “self-preservation [is] of higher obligation” 
than “strict observance of the written law.” Echoing Thomas Jefferson’s extraconstitutional 
justification of the Louisiana Purchase in the face of the enumerated powers in the US 
Constitution (Levinson and Sparrow, 2005, p. 10), the federation-like EU quasi-polity 
introduced a de facto transnational state of emergency that was not contained in its foundational 
treaties (Kuo, 2014b; see also White, 2015a, pp. 304-8).  
The EU constitutional compound, supported by the pillars of its foundational treaties, 
cannot contain emergency powers in a deeper sense. With the European project evolving, the 
EU’s legal competences may appear comprehensive in light of its growing functions. Yet its 
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underlying multilevel constitutional compound is not as “complete” as a constitution in the 
domestic context, since the creation and legitimacy of the EU’s federation-like political order 
does not result from the compound constitution itself (see Kuo, 2014a, pp. 392-3; cf. 
Böckenförde, 2017, p. 165; Loughlin, 2010b, p. 67; Paulus, 2009, p. 76). On the contrary, as 
suggested above, the EU’s composite constitution turns out to be a reflection of the aggregated 
powers held by the various constituent regimes of a multilevel political order. For this reason, 
facing the institutional constraints enshrined in the EU’s foundational treaties amid the crisis, 
the member states simply resorted to their prerogatives under public international law to tackle 
the crisis. As sovereign states, they are vested with the competence to enter into any agreement 
and to create international organizations by concluding treaties. Despite subscribing 
themselves to the EU project, the member states remain the masters of the treaties and the 
international organizations of their creation—including the EU—with their sovereign status 
left reasonably intact (de Witte, 2011, pp. 36-7; White, 2015a, pp. 305-6). As noted above, 
under the multilevel structure of aggregate power, unlimited power may be prevented from 
emerging from the EU’s constitutional landscape with constituent power-exercisers checking 
each other under its multilevel political order. Yet, the resulting balance of power is provisional 
in character and tends to be precarious, since (sovereign) member states are never really 
articulated with other governance entities and so contained by the EU’s composite constitution. 
The existing EU constitutional framework can easily be bypassed if its sovereign masters see 
fit.  
It is noteworthy that the sovereign status of member states does not exculpate the EU 
proper in its swerving toward “constitutional exceptionalism” (White, 2015b, p. 603; cf. 
Joerges, 2016, pp. 306-11). Rather, the EU has cooperated with its sovereign masters by 
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lending its institutions and internal technocrats to those extraconstitutional parallel 
mechanisms in carrying out crisis responses. Under the wings of the EU framework, these 
international civil servants have thus been insulated from parliamentary oversight by member 
states (Riekmann and Wydra, 2013; but cf. Wendler, 2017). Moreover, by turning to the IMF, 
the EU and its sovereign masters have been able to tap into an external source of expertise 
which is accountable neither to the EU nor its member states. Together, these internal and 
external civil servants have become the faceless technocratic enforcers of emergency policies 
(Kuo, 2014b, p. 96). Apart from such expertise, the CJEU has lent further legitimacy to this 
extraconstitutional turn by effectively keeping the parallel mechanism ESM out of the reach 
of EU constitutional requirements in the Pringle case (see Chalmers, 2013; Dimopoulos, 
2015).  
To be sure, the EU is not synonymous with global governance. Nor does its multilevel 
constitutional compound account for the complexity of global constitutionalism. As indicated 
in the World Health Organization’s declaration of a global public health emergency over the 
Ebola outbreak of 2014 (Heath, 2016), not every global state of emergency has ended up 
exceeding the confines of a foundational treaty (ibid., pp. 27-33). Nevertheless, the response 
of the EU and member states to the Eurozone crisis has exposed the weaknesses and dangers 
of the structure of aggregate power in a multilevel political order. In a multilevel constitutional 
compound, sovereign states remain masters who are free to create parallel institutions outside 
the existing constitutional framework, rendering ineffectual the normative framing of global 
governance. By enlisting a corps of faceless international civil servants as their policy 
enforcers, sovereign masters can thus be omnipotent and invisible at the same time. As a whole, 
the extraconstitutional choices made under the aggregate power structure of the composite EU 
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quasi-polity evoke an “emergency without a [s]overeign” (White, 2015a, p. 308; see also Kuo, 
2014b, p. 96).  
5. TAMING BY ARTICULATION? THE FUTURE OF MULTILEVEL 
ORDERING IN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM  
If global constitutional ordering is not immune from swerving to the state of emergency, 
which is regraded as the embarrassing otherness of the rule of law under constitutionalism and 
its guarantor at the same time (Agamben, 2005, pp. 1-11), then, how can transnational 
emergency powers be harnessed to global constitutionalism? As reflected in commentary on 
the Eurozone crisis, the way forward seems to be more constitutionalism. But what kind of 
constitutionalism is the antidote to a transnational state of emergency? Looking to 
constitutional achievements at the nation-state level, we can perhaps think further in the 
direction of articulation. 
Let us take a closer look at the structure of articulated governance that undergirds the 
constitutional separation of powers. According to Waldron (2016), separation of powers is not 
only about checks and balances or dispersal of power, as conventional wisdom has it (pp. 49-
54). Breaking down the constitutional decision-making process into ten stages (including 
envisaging an action, follow-up planning, formulation as legislative bills, choice of methods 
of inspection and enforcement, and post-legislation/adjudication compliance),15 he argues that 
separation of powers is oriented toward a structure of articulated governance. Each stage in the 
“stepwise” decision-making process is distinctive in its contributing to the “incorporation of 
new norms [in the form of which political power is exercised] into the lives and agency of 
those who are to be subject to them” (ibid., p. 64). Together, all these stages not only help 
people to “internalize” norms but also allow norms themselves to “‘settle in’ and become a 
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basis” upon which both people and government agencies plan their next step (ibid., pp. 63-4). 
In this way, stepwise realization of power in political life “embodies the concerns about liberty, 
dignity, and respect that the rule of law represents” (ibid.). 
In this light, global constitutionalism and its corresponding political architecture are still 
a long way from articulated governance. As things stand, the multilevel/global constitutional 
landscape is unlikely to come to terms with the structure of articulated governance anytime 
soon. Nevertheless, another form of articulation which is pivotal to deliberation and political 
action at the heart of articulated governance may provide the antidote to the transnational state 
of emergency now running amok. As discussed above, management of the Eurozone crisis has 
been criticized for the aura of secrecy surrounding its technocratic method and executive 
dominance. In response, transparency and parliamentarianism have been at the centre of reform 
proposals. By this view, technocrats and the executive power can be held to account through 
more transparent decision-making and strengthened parliamentary control (Joerges, 2014a, pp. 
40-2). Yet, in order to effect accountability and political responsibility, one prerequisite is that 
the decision itself, its underlying reasons, and its consequences must be made known to the 
public. For the principle of accountability and the ethic of political responsibility to function 
effectively, a decision-maker needs to articulate his or her choices to the public. Thus, besides 
more transparency and parliamentarianism in general institutional reform, we first need to 
think about what can be done to the multilevel political order to make the principle of 
articulation work within the multilevel constitutional compound. 
It is argued that “irritants”—those disruptive actions taken by stakeholders, especially 
institutional actors—can be regarded as a force of resistance in curtailing self-aggrandizing 
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global governance (Krisch, 2016, pp. 672-8; Teubner, 2012, pp. 62-3, 91-2). Whether such 
institutional irritants signify a mutation of constituent power in the global constitutional 
landscape is not my present concern (compare Krich, 2016, with Teubner, 2012, pp. 61-6). 
Instead, my contention is that institutional irritants are not just disruptive or resistant for the 
purpose of contestation. Short of jurisgenerative political action (Krisch, 2016, p. 665), they 
can be a positive force to facilitate articulation. Take the Eurozone crisis one last time. To 
create a climate congenial for articulation, the EU, or rather its constituent institutions, should 
have resisted lending institutional resources or expertise to the parallel mechanisms created 
outside the EU constitutional framework. True, this would not prevent member states from 
stepping outside the EU to bypass constitutional instruments. Yet such an irritant might make 
member states think twice before adopting such an extraconstitutional strategy. If existing 
institutional and staff resources were unavailable to those parallel mechanisms, member states 
would have less incentive to bypass the governing constitutional instruments. More 
importantly, even if member states could still decide to “go extraconstitutional” despite 
institutional irritants from the constituent institutions of the EU, member states, especially 
ministers and other executive officials, would have to argue their case to the publics. They 
would need to articulate the reasons behind their decision not to work within the multilevel 
constitutional compound and explain how they could legally realign the new 
extraconstitutional mechanism with IMF technocrats from outside the EU. In this way, political 
decision makers could be subjected to tests of political responsibility while a shadowy 
international servant corps would be exposed to some public scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, institutional reactions to the extraconstitutional parallel mechanisms 
created by member states amid the Eurozone crisis were anything but irritating. Not only did 
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the Commission midwife those extraconstitutional mechanisms and lend itself to their 
functioning, but the CJEU also acquiesced in this institutional coup. Failing in its irritant role 
in facilitating articulation and political responsibility, the CJEU has been criticized for 
deferring to the raison d’état of the EU in the Pringle case (Chalmers, 2013, pp. 209-10; 
Joerges, 2014b, pp. 780-3). By contrast, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) 
serial decisions on the EU’s emergency response might be seen as an instance of “interactive 
adjudication” in judicial resistance to the EU’s extraconstitutional turn, despite its nationalist 
overtones.16 To clarify, the institutional resistance as suggested above is not aimed at the 
judicialization of political decision-making,17 but rather intended to facilitate the process of 
public articulation. Faced with extraconstitutional responses to a transnational crisis, the 
constituent institutions of the EU should have asserted themselves vis-à-vis member states to 
maintain the EU as a multilevel constitutional compound.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The challenges that the transnational state of emergency has posed to the multilevel 
constitutional compound of the EU speak to the fundamental weakness of the project of global 
constitutionalism. Sovereignty may be suspended in a global constitutional landscape. When 
push comes to shove, the control of political power through global constitutionalism is fragile. 
Leaving unaddressed the question of the structure of political power in multilevel 
constitutional ordering, global constitutionalism is susceptible to emergency thinking (cf. 
White, 2015a, pp. 312-13). 
Taking on the question of power structure in global constitutionalism, I have argued that 
the asserted multilevel ordering of transnational/global governance rests on a structure of 
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aggregate power and is thus easily switched to constitutional exceptionalism amid a crisis. 
Learning from the development of modern constitutionalism as embodied in the structure of 
articulated governance, multilevel constitutional ordering can exert better control over power-
exercisers under an aggregate structure of global governance. The contrast between articulation 
and aggregation sheds light on the structural weakness of the project of global 
constitutionalism without being entangled with the intractable question of demos, which has 
long dominated the debate as to whether global constitutionalism can be a practicable political 
project (Krisch, 2010, pp. 55-6; see also Besson, 2009). While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to hammer out a constitutional design to tame transnational emergency powers, 
articulation, as discussed above, is nevertheless a direction for further thought in conceiving 
of the future of global constitutionalism. 
The Eurozone crisis has become a moment in time when the values and purposes of a 
multilevel political order in global governance have needed to be articulated and put to the test 
of constitutionalism. Unfortunately, by submitting themselves to raw political decisions at a 
critical juncture, the EU’s constituent institutions have not only thrown the EU’s long-claimed 
vision of the rule of law into doubt but have also struck a blow at global constitutionalism. Yet 
we can perchance find a silver lining for the future of global constitutionalism in the clouds 
hanging over “emergency Europe” (ibid.). Individual stakeholders, especially institutional 
actors, in the existing multilevel constitutional order can help to buttress global 
constitutionalism by asserting themselves against the nationalist tendency toward bypassing 
the working transnational constitutional constraints through the creation of extraconstitutional 
parallel regimes. With such irritants in play, political decision-makers might be forced publicly 
to articulate their reasons for taking extraconstitutional emergency actions and thus shoulder 
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political responsibility. Before the multilevel political order can jump from the logic of 
aggregation to one of articulation, as embodied in the modern constitutional project, public 
articulation can play a role in lessening the problem of transnational emergency powers. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
1 By “constitutionalism” I mean the set of ideas, the core of which is to give a form to political power and 
thereby control it through a fundamental law underpinned by a system of divided power and enshrined rights. 
Thus constitutionalism is normative in character, though it may accommodate various institutional designs such 
as Westminster parliamentarianism and US-style presidentialism (see Grimm, 2016, pp. 3-22). A state that rests 
on constitutionalism may have a limited or an interventionist government (cf. McIlwain, 1947, pp. 20-2). Also, 
constitutionalism is compatible with a wide range of socio-economic systems, including classical liberal 
economies and Nordic welfare states. Notably, such an understanding of constitutionalism, further discussed in 
Section 3, stands apart from the recent pluralist usage of the term such as authoritarian constitutionalism (e.g., 
Tushnet, 2015) or the Chinese style of constitutionalism (e.g., Fu and Zhai, 2018).  
2 Global constitutionalism refers to attempts in scholarship and practice to model multifarious arrangements 
responding to global or transnational governance after the idea of constitutionalism (see generally Dunoff and 
Trachtman, 2009a; see also Schwöbel, 2010). From the participant point of view, global constitutionalism is a 
reform project aimed at current practices of global governance under normative guidance. In contrast, some 
scholars adopt the same term in characterizing the convergence of the contents of national constitutions or the 
global phenomenon of constitutional supremacy (see Law, 2011; Hirschl, 2018).  
3 Notably, the role of politics has come to the attention of many participants in the debate over global 
constitutionalism. For example, drawing on systems theory, Gunther Teubner (2012) provides a sociological 
account of global constitutionalism with a focus on societal-forces-steered politics (pp. 51-72). In contrast, my 
present concern is with political ordering emanating from the debate surrounding global constitutionalism. 
Accordingly, my discussion of theories of global constitutionalism is not comprehensive but rather defined by 
their implications to political ordering as noted above.  
4 Terms such as “multilevel constitutionalism” and “constitutional compound” or “compound/composite 
constitution” are English translations of the German concept Verfassungsverbund, coined to refer to the unique, 
complex constitutional arrangement that encompasses the EU and member states (Mayer and Wendel, 2012, pp. 
128-30; see also Pernice, 2015, 2009, 1999; Voßkuhle, 2010, p. 183). Such terms are also adopted to 
characterize other transnational or global constitutional developments (e.g., Petersmann, 2017; Cohen, 2012, pp. 
48-9; Habermas, 2006, p. 135; cf. de Wet, 2006, p. 53; Cottier and Hertig, 2003, p. 264). I shall further discuss 
the idea of the multilevel constitutional compound later. 
5 By “constituent regime” I mean any (quasi)institutional unit that exercises power in global governance, 
regardless of whether or not it is based on formal legal instruments, including the sovereign state (cf. Krasner, 
1982, p. 186; Young, 2012, p. 11). Constituent regimes and constituent (or component) power-exerciser are 
used interchangeably in the present paper.  
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6 Alexander Somek (2012) dissociates the constituent power from the demos and conceives a transnational 
constituent power in terms of what he calls “interpassivity”, which is distinct from the interactive character of 
the constituent power in modern constitutionalism. Even so, Somek acknowledges that, instead of making 
judgments, the interpassive transnational constituent power amounts to following convention (pp. 48-59). For 
another transnational understanding of constituent power, see Teubner, 2012, pp. 62-3.  
7 For the role of the constitutional contract in a federation, see Schmitt, 2008, pp. 113-24, 385-6; see also 
Böckenförde, 2017, pp. 159-61. I shall come back to the limitations of this analogy in Section 3. 
8 The constitution usually includes a large-C Constitution among other forms of constitutional norms. It is 
noteworthy that a single Constitution is not a precondition for speaking about modern constitutionalism. For 
example, lacking a codified Constitution, Israel has several Basic Laws, which are distinct from and higher than 
ordinary parliamentary legislation in its constitutional order (see Sapir, 2009). 
9 Assuming the fragmentation of global governance, Cohen’s global constitutional project is distinctively 
pluralist relative to other strong federalists in the debate over global constitutionalism (compare Cohen, 2012, 
pp.288-91, with Fassbender, 2009, p. 236; cf. Habermas, 2006, p. 102). 
10 The ESM Treaty came into effect on September 27, 2012. 
11 A new clause was added to the TFEU as Article 136 (3): “The Member States whose currency is the euro 
may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as 
a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality.” It was passed under Article 48 (6) of the TEU. The European Council adopted the treaty 
amendment on March 25, 2011, but the new Article 136 (3) did not come into force until April 2013 when the 
Czech Republic gave its consent.  
12 The Czech government did not sign the TSCG for other reasons.  
13 It is stipulated in Article 16 of the TSCG (see also Fromage and de Witte, 2017). 
14 Notably, the ESM Treaty provides indirectly for IMF involvement in its Preamble (12): “In accordance with 
IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate and proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be 
considered” (see also Kuo, 2014b, p. 85).  
15 Waldron (2016) is ambivalent about how each stage is exactly defined and delineated from others (pp. 63-4).  
16 For example, while the GFCC’s ESM decision could be an instance of interactive adjudication (see Joerges, 
2014a, pp. 43-5; Joerges, 2016, pp. 330-1), its decision on the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) is 
strongly criticized (cf. Joerges, 2014b, pp. 781-2). 
17 Concerns about the judicialization of political decision-making lie at the heart of Judge Gertrude Lübbe-
Wolff’s dissenting opinion in the GFCC’s OMT decision (see Schiek, 2014, pp. 340-1).  
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